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Abstract. The most well known probability distribution of probabilities is the
Beta distribution. If we have observed r ‘successes’, each having a probability
θ, and n− r ‘failures’, each having a probability 1− θ. In this paper we will
derive a whole family of Beta-like distributions, which take as their data not
only the number of successes and failures, but also values on predictor variables
and time to failure or time without failure.
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Preface
The most well known probability distribution of probabilities is the Beta distri-
bution. If we have observed r ‘successes’, each having a probability θ, and n − r
‘failures’, each having a probability 1− θ. Then the corresponding Beta distribution
if θ is given as:
p(θ| r, n) = (n− 1)!
(r − 1)! (n− r − 1)!θ
r−1 (1− θ)n−r−1 .
We will proceed in this paper to derive a whole family of Beta-like distributions,
which take as their data not only the number of successes and failures, but also
values on predictor variables and time to failure or time without failure.
The recurring theme in all this will be that, apart from the ordinary product
and sum rules (e.g., Bayes’ theorem and the integrating out of nuisance parameters),
a change-of-variable or, alternatively, a Jacobian transformation allows us to map
the uncertainty we have, regarding the unknown parameter(s), as captured in
the corresponding posterior, unto the probability of interest; thus, allowing us to
construct a probability distribution of the probability of interest.
The Beta-Like distribution is the distribution that takes into account the
epistemological parameter uncertainty, as captured in the posterior distribution of
these parameters, of the parameters of a given probability model. The Bayesian
model selection, also discussed in this paper, takes into account the epistemological
model uncertainty1.
In this paper we will be talking about failure mechanisms which have some
underlying probabilistic ‘generating’ process. In light of this loose terminolgy, we
1In the Bayesian view of probability theory there is no uncertainty other than epistemological,
seeing that a probability distribution over some set of propositions reflect our state of knowledge
regarding the plausibilities of these propositions, [6]. For example, the coin has a mass, a center
of gravity, a circumference, a width, etc... . But it does not have the physical property: the
probability of head or tails. And we know of at least one recorded instance were a coin landed
spinning on its side and remained standing on its side as its spinning subsided, until it came to a
halt, while still standing on its side.
v
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would like to give, as a caveat, the following quote2 by Jaynes, who is considered by
many to be the father of modern Bayesianity, [5]:
[T]he judgment of a competent engineer, based on data of past
experience in the field, represents information fully as ‘objective’ and
reliable as anything we can possibly learn from a random experiment.
Indeed, most engineers would make a stronger statement; since
a random experiment is, by definition, one in which the outcome
- and therefore the conclusion we draw from it - is subject to
uncontrollable variations, it follows that the only fully ‘objective’
means of judging the reliability of a system is through analysis
of stresses, rate of wear, etc., which avoids random experiments
altogether.
In practice, the real function of a reliability test is to check
against the possibility of completely unexpected modes of failure;
once a given failure mode is recognized and its mechanism un-
derstood, no sane engineer would dream of judging its chances of
occurring merely from a random experiment.
In closing, the probability models used in this paper are by no way exhaustive.
For example, we are currently studying the Negative Binomial probability model.
A probability model which is particularly popular among seismologists. And we
have already found that a lot of interesting things can be said about this about the
Negative Binomial generating process. But this will be subject of another paper.
2In this quote Jaynes answers the charge that only long term frequencies of random experiments
may be considered ‘objective’. Bayesian probability theory was formulated in 1774 by the physicist
Laplace, who used this probability theory to identify those problems in celestial mechanics where
the data seemed to contradict the then current theory. This allowed Laplace to be highly productive
in this field of science, so much so, that in his time he was called the French Newton. But shortly
after his death Laplace’s probability theory was attacked by a school of pure mathematicians, who
thought the definition of a probability as a state of knowledge to be lacking in rigor. Instead, they
proposed that a probability should mean to be the ‘observed’ long term frequency of (an imaginary
infinity of) random experiments. For a time this viewpoint dominated the field so completely that
those who were students in the period 1930-1960 were hardly aware that any other conception had
ever existed, [5].
CHAPTER 1
Explicit Probability Distributions for Probabilities
1. Predictors, the Logistic Regression Model.
1.1. The Probability Model. In the logistic regression model, we model the
log-odds of some event by way of a regression model, say,
log
θ
1− θ = β0 + β1z, (1.1)
where z is some predictor value. Identity (1.1) implies that the probability of success
θ can be written down as as the following function of the unknown parameters β0
and β1:
θ =
exp (β0 + β1z)
1 + exp (β0 + β1z)
. (1.2)
Likewise, the probability of a failure can be written down as:
1− θ = 1
1 + exp (β0 + β1z)
. (1.3)
1.2. The Likelihood, Prior, and Posterior. Say, we have r successes, with
corresponding predictor values x1, . . . , xr, and n − r failures, with corresponding
predictor values y1, . . . , yn−r. Then, by way of (1.2) and (1.3), the probability of
the observed data, or, equivalently, the likelihood of the unknown parameters β0
and β1, can be written down as:
p(D|β0, β1) = L(β0, β1) =
r∏
i=1
exp (β0 + β1xi)
1 + exp (β0 + β1xi)
n−r∏
j=1
1
1 + exp (β0 + β1yj)
(1.4)
We assign some uniform prior to the unknown parameters β0 and β1, as is
customary in Bayesian regression analysis, [10]:
p(β0, β1) ∝ constant, (1.5)
where ‘∝’ is the proportionality sign.
By multiplying the likelihood with the prior, respectively, (1.4) and (1.5), one
may obtain, by way of product rule, or, equivalently, Bayes’ theorem, [6], the joint
distribution of β0 and β1:
p(D,β0, β1) ∝
r∏
i=1
exp (β0 + β1xi)
1 + exp (β0 + β1xi)
n−r∏
j=1
1
1 + exp (β0 + β1yj)
. (1.6)
1
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Now, if we wish to obtain the probability distribution of the unknown parameters
β0 and β1, conditional on the data D, or, equivalently, the posterior of β0 and β1,
we must, by way of the product rule, [6], divide (1.6) with the evidence
p(D) =
∫ ∫
p(D,β0, β1) dβ0dβ1 = C. (1.7)
However, if we do this, then the inverse of the evidence, C−1, being a constant not
dependent upon the parameters β0 and β1, gets absorbed in the proportionality
sign of (1.6); thus, giving us a posterior:
p(β0, β1|D) = p(D,β0, β1)
p(D)
∝
r∏
i=1
exp (β0 + β1xi)
1 + exp (β0 + β1xi)
n−r∏
j=1
1
1 + exp (β0 + β1yj)
,
(1.8)
which is proportional to both the likelihood (1.4) and the joint distribution (1.6).
However, we are not that much interested in the probability distribution of β0
and β1. Since we are aiming for the probability distribution of the probability of a
success θ, given a predictor value z, (1.2).
Would we know the values of β0 and β1 exactly, as we know our predictor value
z, then we could substitute these values directly into (1.2) and, thus, get the exact
probability θ. Now, we do not know the values of β0 and β1 exactly. Instead, we
have a range of probable values on the β0- and β1-axes, as captured by the posterior
(1.8). This corresponds, through a two-to-one mapping, with a range of probable
values on the θ-axis. This two-to-one mapping is, typically, accomplished by way of
a Jacobian transformation.
1.3. The Jacobian Transformation. By way of (1.2), we have that
θ =
exp (β0 + β1z)
1 + exp (β0 + β1z)
.
So, a possible transformation from (β0, β1) to (θ, b1) is
β0 = − log 1− θ
θ
− b1z, β1 = b1, (1.9)
which has a corresponding Jacobian of
J =
∣∣∣∣∣ ∂∂θβ0 ∂∂b1 β0∂
∂θβ1
∂
∂b1
β1
∣∣∣∣∣ =
∣∣∣∣∣ 1θ(1−θ) −z0 1
∣∣∣∣∣ = 1θ (1− θ) . (1.10)
Substituting (1.9) into the posterior (1.8), and multiplying it with the Jacobian
(1.10), gives us the transformed posterior:
p(θ, b1| z,D) ∝ 1
θ (1− θ)
r∏
i=1
θ
1−θ e
(xi−z)b1
1 + θ1−θ e
(xi−z)b1
n−r∏
j=1
1
1 + θ1−θ e
(yj−z)b1 . (1.11)
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If we numerically integrate out the unwanted parameter b1 out of (1.11), we get the
posterior of the probability θ, given the data D and some predictor value z:
p(θ| z,D) =
∫
p(θ, b1| z,D) db1, (1.12)
which gives us the Bayesian logistic regression model we are looking for.
Note that for non-informative data, that is, for predictors which all have the
same value, that is, z = xi = yj , for i = 1, . . . , r and j = 1, . . . , n− r, the terms in
the exponentials of (1.11) all become zero, and, as a consequence, (1.12) collapses
to the ordinary Beta distribution:
p(θ| z,D) ∝ 1
θ (1− θ)
r∏
i=1
θ
1−θ
1 + θ1−θ
n−r∏
j=1
1
1 + θ1−θ
= θr−1 (1− θ)n−r−1 , (1.13)
which is in nice correspondence with our intuition.
If the predictors are non-informative, in that they ‘flat-line’, then the only
pertinent aspect of the data D which remains, is the number of successes and
failures, respectively, r and n− r, and these are just the sufficient statistics of the
Beta distribution.
2. Times to Failure and Times Without Failure, the Exponential Model
2.1. The Probability Model. Say, we have an Exponential failure mecha-
nism, then the probability of a failure at time t is
P ( t|λ) = λ exp (−λt) dt. (2.1)
Consequently, the probability of no failure until time τ is
P ( t > τ |λ) =
∫ ∞
τ
λ exp (−λt) dt = exp (−λτ) . (2.2)
In most reliability problems we will be interested in determining probability
(2.2). That is, in general we will wish to find the probability distribution of
θ = exp (−λτ) , (2.3)
where τ is some desired life-time and λ is the unknown parameter of the Exponential
distribution.
2.2. The Likelihood, Prior, and Posterior. Say, we have n identical units,
which we follow in time. If we observe a sequence of r failure times, say, x1, . . . , xr,
and n− r units that did not fail, these having, consequently, having times without
failure, say, y1, . . . , yn−r. Then, by way of (2.1) and (2.2), the probability of the
observed data, or, equivalently, the likelihood of the unknown parameter λ, can be
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written down as
p(D|λ) = L(λ)
=
r∏
i=1
λ exp (−λxi) dxi
n−r∏
j=1
exp (−λyj) (2.4)
∝
r∏
i=1
λ exp (−λxi)
n−r∏
j=1
exp (−λyj) ,
where we let the constant term (dxi)
r
be absorbed in the proportionality sign.
It would not be strange if our our prior information consisted of an initial gues
of a life-time of, say, t. This initial guess corresponds with a prior likelihood of
P ( t|λ) = λ exp (−λt) dt. (2.5)
Combining the prior likelihood (2.5) with the uninformative Jeffreys’ prior for the
inverse failure rate λ,
p(λ) ∝ 1
λ
, (2.6)
we get, by way of the product rule and the Bayesian proportionality short hand,
the informative prior of λ, based on the initial guess of a life-time of t:
p(λ| t) ∝ exp (−λt) , (2.7)
where we have absorbed both the differential dt of (2.5) and the normalizing constant
of (2.6) into the proportionality sign of (2.7).
Note that the prior (2.7) may also be obtained through an alternative maximum
entropy argument, [5]. But we give, instead, the above derivation. Because it is
analogous to the derivation of the informative prior for a postulated Weibull failure
mechanism, treated below.
Combining the likelihood with the informative prior, respectively, (2.4) and
(2.7), by way of the product rule and the Bayesian proportionality short hand, we
get the posterior for the unknown parameter λ:
p(λ|D, t) ∝ exp (−λt)
r∏
i=1
λ exp (−λxi)
n−r∏
j=1
exp (−λyj) . (2.8)
The posterior (2.8) is the probability distribution of the unknown parameter λ,
conditional on the data D we have observed and our tentative guess of a life-time
of t. However, we are not that much interested in the probability distribution of
λ. Rather, we are aiming for the probability distribution of the probability of the
life-time exceeding τ , (2.3).
Would we know the value of λ exactly, then we could substitute this value into
(2.3) and, so, get the exact probability θ. Now, we do not know the value of λ
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exactly. Instead, we have a range of probable values on the λ-axis, as captured by
the posterior (2.8). This corresponds, through a one-to-one mapping, with a range
of probable values on the θ-axis.
This one-to-one mapping is, typically, accomplished by way of a change of
variable.
2.3. The Change of Variable. By way of (2.3), we have that
θ = exp (−λτ) .
So, the corresponding transformation is
λ = − log θ
τ
, dλ =
∣∣∣∣−dθθτ
∣∣∣∣ = dθθτ . (2.9)
Substituting the change of variable (2.9) into the posterior (2.8), we obtain the
transformed posterior distribution of the probability θ that a given unit will have a
life-time exceeding τ :
p[θ|T (D, t) , r, τ ] ∝ (− log θ)
r
θ
exp
[
log θ
τ
T (D, t)
]
, (2.10)
where
T (D, t) ≡ t+
r∑
i=1
xi +
n−r∑
j=1
yj , (2.11)
is the total observed time without failure, r is the number of observed failures, and
τ is the life-time that has to be exceeded.
If we properly normalize (2.10), we get the identity:
p[θ|T (D, t) , r, τ ] =
[
T (D, t)
τ
]r+1
(− log θ)r
r!θ
exp
[
log θ
τ
T (D, t)
]
, (2.12)
By way of (2.12), the expectation value of the probability that a given unit will
a life-time that exceeds τ , then is
E(θ) =
∫ 1
0
θ p[θ|T (D, t) , r, τ ] dθ =
[
T (D, t)
T (D, t) + τ
]r+1
. (2.13)
This expectation value, which itself is a probability, is the result of Example 3, given
in [5]. However, there it was not yet recognized that this probability is the mean of
an underlying Beta-Like probability distribution1
Following Jaynes, we subject (2.13) to various extreme conditions, in order to
show the correspondance with the indications of common sense.
1This, if anything, is an attestment to the richness of Jaynes’ work. Even by working through the
most casual of his derivations, one may still be rwarded for one’s efforts by little gems, like the
Beta-Like distributions given here.
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If the total, say, unit-hours of the test is small compared to prior expected
life-time t, that is, if
∑
i xi +
∑
j yj << t. Then, (2.11),
T (D, t) ≈ t,
and, unless a large number of failures r is observed, our state of knowledge about θ
can hardly be changed by the test, and, as a consequence, we have to rely on our
prior knowledge only.
If the total, say, unit-hours of the test is large compared to prior expected
life-time t, that is, if
∑
i xi +
∑
j yj >> t. Then, (2.11),
T (D, t) ≈
r∑
i=1
xi +
n−r∑
j=1
yj ,
and, for all intents and purposes, our final conclusions depend only what we observed
in the test, and, as a consequence, these conclusions are almost independent of what
we previously thought previously.
In intermediate cases, our prior knowledge has a weight comparable to that of
the test. If t >> τ , the amount of testing required is appreciably reduced. For if we
were already quite sure that the units are satisfactory, then we require less additional
evidence before accepting them. But if t << τ , that is, if we are initially very
doubtful about the units, then we demand that the test itself provide compelling
evidence in favor of their reliability.
3. Times to Failure Without Failure, the Weibull Model
This is a repeat of the previous case, with the difference that we now use a
Weibull failure mechanism instead of an Exponential one.
3.1. The Probability Model. Say, we have a Weibull failure mechanism,
then the probability of a failure at time t is
P ( t| k, λ) = kλ (kλ)k−1 exp
[
(−tλ)k
]
dt. (3.1)
Consequently, the probability of no failure until time τ is
P ( t > τ | k, λ) =
∫ ∞
τ
kλ (kλ)
k−1
exp
[
(−tλ)k
]
dt = exp
[
(−τλ)k
]
. (3.2)
In most reliability problems we will be interested in determining probability
(3.2). That is, in general we wish to find the probability distribution of
θ = exp
[
(−λτ)k
]
, (3.3)
where τ is some desired life-time, and λ and k are, respectively, the unknown inverse
failure rate and shape parameter of the Weibull distribution.
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3.2. The Likelihood, Prior, and Posterior. Say, we have n identical units,
which we follow in time. If we observe a sequence of r failure times, say, x1, . . . , xr,
and n− r units that did not fail, these having, consequently, having times without
failure, say, y1, . . . , yn−r. Then, by way of (3.1) and (3.2), the probability of the
observed data, or, equivalently, the likelihood of the unknown parameters λ and k,
can be written down as
p(D| k, λ) = L(k, λ)
=
r∏
i=1
kλ (λxi)
k−1
exp
[
(−λxi)k
]
dxi
n−r∏
j=1
exp
[
(−λyj)k
]
(3.4)
∝
r∏
i=1
kλ (λxi)
k−1
exp
[
(−λxi)k
] n−r∏
j=1
exp
[
(−λyj)k
]
,
where we let the constant term (dxi)
r
be absorbed in the proportionality sign.
If our our prior information consisted of an initial gues of a life-time of, say, t.
This initial guess corresponds with a prior likelihood of
P ( t| k, λ) = kλ (λt)k−1 exp
[
(−λt)k
]
dt. (3.5)
Combining the prior likelihood (3.5) with the uninformative Jeffreys’ prior for the
inverse failure rate and shape parameter, respectively, λ and k,
p(k, λ) = p(k) p(λ) ∝ 1
kλ
, (3.6)
we get, by way of the product rule and the Bayesian proportionality short hand,
the informative prior of λ and k, based on the initial guess of a life-time of t:
p(k, λ| t) ∝ (λt)k−1 exp
[
(−λt)k
]
, (3.7)
where we have absorbed both the differential dt of (3.5) and the normalizing constant
of (3.6) into the proportionality sign of (3.7).
In [1], an alternative informative prior is derived, where the piece of prior
information consists of an initial guess of the time without failure, s∗. Now, would
we have no initial guess whatsoever, neither for the time to failure nor for the
time without failure, then the proper cause of action would be to assign as an
uninformative prior the prior (3.6).
Combining the likelihood with the informative prior, respectively, (3.4) and
(3.7), by way of the product rule and the Bayesian proportionality short hand, we
get the posterior for the unknown parameters λ and k:
p(k, λ|D, t) ∝ (λt)k−1 exp
[
(−λt)k
] r∏
i=1
kλ (λxi)
k−1
exp
[
(−λxi)k
] n−r∏
j=1
exp
[
(−λyj)k
]
.
(3.8)
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The posterior (3.8) is the probability distribution of the unknown parameters
λ and k, conditional on the data D we have observed and our tentative guess
of a life-time of t. However, we are not that much interested in the probability
distribution of λ and k. Rather, we are aiming for the probability distribution of
the probability of the life-time exceeding τ , (3.3).
Would we know the values of λ and k exactly, then we could substitute this
value into (3.3) and, so, get the exact probability θ. Now, we do not know the
values of λ and k exactly. Instead, we have a range of probable values on the λ- and
k-axes, as captured by the posterior (3.8). This corresponds, through a two-to-one
mapping, with a range of probable values on the θ-axis.
This two-to-one mapping is, typically, accomplished by way of a Jacobian
transformation.
3.3. The Jacobian Transformation. By way of (3.3), we have that
θ = exp
[
(−λτ)k
]
.
So, a possible transformation is
λ =
(− log θ) 1κ
τ
, k = κ, (3.9)
which has a corresponding Jacobian of
J =
∣∣∣∣∣ ∂∂θλ ∂∂κλ∂
∂θk
∂
∂κk
∣∣∣∣∣ =
∣∣∣∣∣∣ −
(− log θ)κ−1κ
τκθ f(θ, κ)
0 1
∣∣∣∣∣∣ ∝ (− log θ)
−κ−1κ
τκθ
. (3.10)
Substituting (3.9) into the posterior (3.8), and multiplying it with the Jacobian
(3.10), gives us the transformed posterior:
p[κ, θ|T (D, t, κ) , r, τ ] ∝
(
t
r∏
i=1
xi
)κ−1
κr−1
τκ(r+1)
(− log θ)r
θ
exp
[
log θ
τκ
T (D, t, κ)
]
,
(3.11)
where κ is the shape parameter of the Weibull distribution and where
T (D, t, κ) ≡ tκ +
r∑
i=1
xκi +
n−r∑
j=1
yκj , (3.12)
is the total power-transformed observed time without failure, r is the number of
observed failures, and τ is the life-time that has to be exceeded.
Note that if we set the shape parameter to κ = 1, or, equivalently, we go from
the Weibull to the more restrictive Exponential failure mechanism, then, by way of
the proportionality sign, the posterior (3.11) collapses to (2.10), which is at should
be.
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Looking at the statistic (3.12), we see that for, say, κ = 2, one observation
having no failure until time y = 7 is equivalent to 49 observations having no failure
until time y = 1.
For κ = 1, where the Weibull collapses to the memoryless Exponential distri-
bution, one observation having no failure time until time y = 7 is equivalent to 7
observations having no failure until time y = 1.
This reflects the Weibull’s dependence on the shape parameter κ. For large
values of κ, extended periods without failure become less probable. Thus, observing
one extended period without failure carries the same weight as observing many more
short periods without failure.
If we numerically integrate out the unwanted parameter κ out of (3.11), we get
the posterior of the probability θ, given the data D and the initial guess of time
without failure, t:
p(θ| t,D, τ) =
∫
p[κ, θ|T (D, t, κ) , r, τ ] dκ. (3.13)

CHAPTER 2
Implicit Probability Distributions for
Probabilities, Part I
There are instances were we cannot rewrite any of the unknown parameters
in the posterior as a function of θ, as was done, for example, in (1.9), (2.9), and
(3.9). This, then, prohibits us from finding the explicit form of the corresponding
Beta-like distribution.
However, we may still find the first moments of these intractable distributions.
Thus, allowing us to either approximate the corresponding probability distribution
or, alternatively, to construct confidence bounds on the estimated probabilities.
1. Times to m Events, the Poisson Model
1.1. The Probability Model. Here we define the probability of interest, θ,
to be the probability of m events occurring within the time period τ , by a mechanism
which is modeled by an underlying Exponential distribution, having an unknown
parameter λ.
The data consists of single events observed at variable, though consecutive,
waiting times t1, . . . , tm, and a non-event from the last failure, which is observed at
time
∑
j tj , onwards, until the end of the time period τ :
P (m|λ, τ) =
∫ τ
0
∫ τ−t1
0
· · ·
∫ τ−∑m−1j=1 tj
0
λe−λt1λe−λt2 · · ·λe−λtme−λ(τ−
∑
j tj)dtm · · · dt2dt1,
=
(λτ)
m
m!
exp (−λτ) . (1.1)
An inspection of (1.1) learns us that the probability of interest has the form of
a Poisson distribution, which has an expected number of events equal to λτ . So, we
define our probability of interest to be
θ =
(λτ)
m
m!
exp (−λτ) . (1.2)
1.2. The Likelihood, Prior, and Posterior. In a total time period of, say,
T , we observe n consecutive times to an even, x1, . . . , xn. Assuming an Exponential
event-generating mechanism,
P (xi|λ) = λ exp (−λxi) dxi, (1.3)
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the probability of the observed data, or, equivalently, the likelihood of the unknown
parameter λ, which is the expected of events per time unit, may be written down as
P (D|λ) = L(λ)
= exp
[
−λ
(
T −
∑
i
xi
)]
n∏
i=1
λ exp (−λxi) dxi (1.4)
∝ λn exp (−λT ) ,
where we have absorbed the term (dxi)
n
into the proportionality sign.
If we have an initial guess that the time to an event is t, we may assign the
informative prior (2.7)
p(λ| t) ∝ exp (−λt) . (1.5)
However, if we do not feel confident enough, to make such a prior guess, we may
alternatively, assign an uninformative Jeffreys prior
p(λ) ∝ 1
λ
.
Multiplying the likelihood with the informative prior, respectively, (1.4) and
(1.5), we may obtain the posterior of λ:
p(λ|D, t) ∝ λn exp [−λ (T + t)] . (1.6)
where the pertinent aspects of the data D are the number of events, n, and the
total time of observation T .
As an aside, if we have two data sets of the same phenomena under observation,
say, D1 and D2, having, respectively, n1 and n2 observed events in the respective
periods T1 and T2, then these data sets, together with the informative prior (1.5),
would combine to the posterior
p(λ|D1, D2, t) ∝ λn1+n2 exp [−λ (T1 + T2 + t)] .
Now, would we attempt in (1.2) to make a change of variable from λ to θ, then
we find that λ cannot be written unambiguously as a function of θ for m > 0; where
m = 0 is equivalent to the Exponential probability model, (2.3). It follows that we
can make no analytical change of variable for the Poission model probability (1.2),
or, equivalently, derive the explicit Beta-Like distribution for this probability model.
But what we can do, is derive the first moments of this intractable Beta-Like
distribution. This will allow us to either compute the skewness corrected confidence
bounds for this intractable distribution, or, alternatively, construct the MaxEnt
distribution which has the same moments as this intractable distribution, respectively,
[3] and [9].
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1.3. MaxEnt Distributions. In what follows we give a short outline on how
to derive fourth-order MaxEnt distributions. Three well-known MaxEnt distribu-
tions are the uniform, exponential, and normal distributions. These distributions
correspond, respectively, with zeroth-, first-, and second-order MaxEnt distributions.
For a given probability distribution
p(θ| {λ}) ,
where θ is the parameter of interest and {λ} is some set of parameters which make
up this probability distribution, the first four cumulants are given as:
µ =
∫
θ p(θ| {λ}) dθ,
σ =
√∫
(θ − µ)2 p(θ| {λ}) dθ,
γ =
∫
(θ − µ)3 p(θ| {λ}) dθ
σ3
, (1.7)
κ =
∫
(θ − µ)4 p(θ| {λ}) dθ
σ4
.
where µ is the mean, σ is the standard deviation, γ is the skewness, and κ is the
kurtosis of the probability distribution p(θ| {λ}).
The fourth-order MaxEnt distribution incorporates information about the skew-
ness and kurtosis, respectively, γ and κ, (1.7), as well as the mean and standard
deviation, respectively, µ and σ. The algorithm for higher-order MaxEnt distribu-
tions is due to Rockinger and Jondeau, [9].
We will now proceed to give the algorithmic steps needed to construct fourth-
order MaxEnt approximations of intractable Beta-like distributions.
Step 1.
The fourth-order MaxEnt distribution we seek takes as its input the first four
cumulants of the probability distribution we wish to approximate.
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For example, if wish to determine the fourth-order MaxEnt distrbution of θ.
Then we first compute the first four moments of θ, (1.2), (1.6), and (1.7):
m1 =
∫ [
(λτ)
m
m!
exp (−λτ)
]1
λn exp [−λ (T + t)] dλ,
m2 =
∫ [
(λτ)
m
m!
exp (−λτ)
]2
λn exp [−λ (T + t)] dλ,
m3 =
∫ [
(λτ)
m
m!
exp (−λτ)
]3
λn exp [−λ (T + t)] dλ, (1.8)
m4 =
∫ [
(λτ)
m
m!
exp (−λτ)
]4
λn exp [−λ (T + t)] dλ,
The moments in (1.8) evaluate to
m1 =
(m+ n)!
m!n!
(
τ
τ + T + t
)m(
T + t
τ + T + t
)n+1
,
m2 =
(2m+ n)!
(m!)
2
n!
(
τ
2τ + T + t
)2m(
T + t
2τ + T + t
)n+1
,
m3 =
(3m+ n)!
(m!)
3
n!
(
τ
3τ + T + t
)3m(
T + t
3τ + T + t
)n+1
, (1.9)
m4 =
(4m+ n)!
(m!)
4
n!
(
τ
4τ + T + t
)4m(
T + t
4τ + T + t
)n+1
.
By way of (1.9) and the identities, [4],
µ = m1,
σ =
√
m2 −m21,
γ =
m3 − 3m2 m1 + 2m31
σ3
, (1.10)
κ =
m4 − 4m3 m1 + 6m2 m21 − 3m41
σ4
,
we may then compute the first four cumulants, needed for the construction of the
fourth-order MaxEnt distribution.
Step 2.
We now plug the third and fourth cumulant, respectively, γ and κ, into the integral
function
Q(ϕ1, ϕ2, ϕ3, ϕ4) =
∫ b
a
exp
[
ϕ1x+ ϕ2
(
x2 − 1)+ ϕ3 (x3 − γ)+ ϕ4 (x4 − κ)] dx,
(1.11)
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where1
a = −µ
σ
, b =
1− µ
σ
. (1.12)
Then minimize (1.11) over the vector (ϕ1, ϕ2, ϕ3, ϕ4), in order to obtain the
minimization estimates (ϕˆ1, ϕˆ2, ϕˆ3, ϕˆ4).
Step 3.
We then make a change of variable from x to θ, where
x =
θ − µ
σ
, (1.13)
in order to obtain the unscaled MaxEnt distribution on the θ axis:
p(θ|µ, σ, γ, κ) ∝ 1
σ
exp
[
ϕˆ1
θ − µ
σ
+ ϕˆ2
(
θ − µ
σ
)2
+ ϕˆ3
(
θ − µ
σ
)3
+ ϕˆ4
(
θ − µ
σ
)4]
.
(1.14)
The normalizing constant of (1.14) then may be computed by way of the integral,
(1.12) and (1.13),
C =
∫ 1
0
p(θ|µ, σ, γ, κ) dθ, (1.15)
The properly normalized fourth-order MaxEnt approximation of the intractable
beta-like distribution, which has its probability model (1.2), is then given as, (1.9),
(1.10), (1.11), (1.14), and (1.15):
p(θ|µ, σ, γ, κ) = 1
Cσ
exp
[
ϕˆ1
θ − µ
σ
+ ϕˆ2
(
θ − µ
σ
)2
+ ϕˆ3
(
θ − µ
σ
)3
+ ϕˆ4
(
θ − µ
σ
)4]
,
(1.16)
where 0 ≤ θ ≤ 1.
2. Times to m Events, the Cumulative Poisson Model
2.1. The Probability Model. In the preceeding discussion we discussed the
Beta-Like distribution of the probability of m events occurring within the time period
τ , by a mechanism which is modeled by an underlying Exponential distribution,
having an unknown parameter λ. This probability distribution may be of interest
if we have a parallel system of m non-redundent fail-safe mechanisms, where each
mechanism admits an Exponential time to failure model.
Now, we can envisage scenarios in which we wish to determine the Beta-Like
distribution of the probability of more than m events occurring within the time period
τ , by a mechanism which is modeled by an underlying Exponential distribution,
having an unknown parameter λ. One such scenario may be where we have a system
1The limits of integration are determined by the identities:
µ+ aσ = 0, µ+ bσ = 1.
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which is subject to successive loads, each load admitting an Exponential time to
occurrence model. The system then might be hypothesized to be able up to m such
loads, before a significant wear and tear occurs.
For this scenario the probability model of interest is
θ = 1−
m∑
i=0
(λτ)
i
i!
exp (−λτ) . (2.1)
Now, (2.1) is just a probability, just like, say, (1.2) is, which admits an un-
certainty regarding the actual value of the inverse failure rate λ, as captured by
the posterior (1.6). So, we may proceed to compute the first four moments of
the Beta-Like probability distribution which results from the uncertainty we have
regarding the actual value of λ:
m1 =
∫ [
1−
m∑
i=0
(λτ)
i
i!
exp (−λτ)
]1
λn exp [−λ (T + t)] dλ,
m2 =
∫ [
1−
m∑
i=0
(λτ)
i
i!
exp (−λτ)
]2
λn exp [−λ (T + t)] dλ,
m3 =
∫ [
1−
m∑
i=0
(λτ)
i
i!
exp (−λτ)
]3
λn exp [−λ (T + t)] dλ, (2.2)
m4 =
∫ [
1−
m∑
i=0
(λτ)
i
i!
exp (−λτ)
]4
λn exp [−λ (T + t)] dλ,
Having obtained these moments we may compute the relevant cumulants, by way of
(1.10), and either proceed to construct the fourth-order MaxEnt approximation of
the intractable Beta-Like distribution of (1.16).
3. Predictors, the Poisson Regression Model
3.1. The Probability Model. In the Poisson regression model the number
of events occuring, m, in a given time period, τ , has Poisson distribution:
P (m|λ, τ) = (λτ)
m
m!
exp (−λτ) , (3.1)
where the logarithm of the expected number of events per time unit, λ, is modeled
by way of a regression model:
log λ = β0 + β1z. (3.2)
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If we take the exponential of (3.2), and substitute it into (3.1), we get the probability
model:
θ =
[exp (β0 + β1z) τ ]
m
m!
exp [− exp (β0 + β1z) τ ]
=
τm
m!
exp [m (β0 + β1z)− exp (β0 + β1z) τ ] (3.3)
3.2. The Likelihood, Prior, and Posterior. The data D consists of n
counts, r1, . . . , rn, with corresponding predictor values x1, . . . , xn. Using (3.3), the
probability of the data D, or, equivalently, the likelihood of the unknown parameters
β0 and β1, may be written down as
p(D|β0, β1) =
n∏
i=1
τ ri
ri!
exp [ri (β0 + β1xi)− exp (β0 + β1xi) τ ]
∝
n∏
i=1
exp [ri (β0 + β1xi)− exp (β0 + β1xi) τ ] (3.4)
∝ exp
[∑
i
ri (β0 + β1xi)− τ
∑
i
exp (β0 + β1xi)
]
We assign some uniform prior to the unknown regression parameters β0 and β1:
p(D|β0, β1) ∝
n∏
i=1
exp [ri (β0 + β1xi)− exp (β0 + β1xi) τ ] (3.5)
By multiplying the likelihood (3.4) with the prior (3.5), one may obtain the
unscaled posterior of β0 and β1:
p(β0, β1|D) ∝ p(β0, β1) ∝ exp
[∑
i
ri (β0 + β1xi)− τ
∑
i
exp (β0 + β1xi)
]
. (3.6)
Since we can make no analytical Jacobian transformation from the β0 and β1
to the probability model θ, we compute the first moments of (3.3), by way of the
posterior (3.6), and proceed to construct either the skewness corrected confidence
interval or the MaxEnt approximation of the corresponding Beta-Like distribution.

CHAPTER 3
Implicit Probability Distributions for
Probabilities, Part II
We will here construct the Beta-Like distribution of a Poisson-Like probability
model. We define the probability of interest, θ, to be the probability of m events
occurring within the time period τ , by a mechanism which is modeled by an
underlying Weibull distribution, having an unknown parameters λ and k.
The advantage of a Weibull over an Exponential mechanism, is that the shape
parameter k of the former represents an extra degree of freedom, as it may take on
any value greater than zero; whereas, in the latter it is dogmatically set to one.
Regular Poisson distributions have as their event-generating mechanism Expo-
nential distributions, (1.1). In contrast, a sequence of Weibull distributed events
leaves us with an analytically intractable integral.
However, making use of an unexpected equivalence relationship, we may work
around the encountered integral and, so, proceed to approximate the Poisson-Like
distribution.
1. The Issue
We first present the case for the regular Poisson distribution, as this will give
us a handle on how to generalize from the Poisson to the Poisson-Like distribution.
Let θ be the probability of m failures occurring within time period τ . The
failure mechanism generating these events is the Exponential distribution, having
an unknown parameter λ. The data we will use is failures at variable, though
consecutive, times t1, . . . , tm, and a non-failure from the last failure, at time tm,
onwards, until the end of the time period τ , (1.1):
θ =
∫ τ
0
∫ τ−t1
0
· · ·
∫ τ−∑m−1j=1 tj
0
λe−λt1λe−λt2 · · ·λe−λtme−λ(τ−
∑
j tj)dtm · · · dt2dt1,
= λme−λτ
∫ τ
0
∫ τ−t1
0
· · ·
∫ τ−∑m−1j=1 tj
0
dtm · · · dt2dt1, (1.1)
where it may be found, by way of induction, that∫ τ
0
∫ τ−t1
0
· · ·
∫ τ−∑m−1j=1 tj
0
dtm · · · dt2dt1 = τ
m
m!
. (1.2)
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Substituting (1.2) into (1.1), we find that θ is just the traditional Poisson
probability of m events occurring in a time period τ , (1.2):
θ =
(λτ)
m
m!
exp (−λτ) , (1.3)
where λτ is the expected number of failures within the time period τ .
We again define θ to be the probability of m failures occurring within the time
period τ , but now by a failure mechanism which is modelled by an unerlying Weibull
distribution having parameters λ and k.
The Weibull model, having one more parameter, is more flexible than the
Exponential model. In fact, the Exponential is a special case of the Weibull, were
we set the shape paramter k to one.
The data, again, consists of failures at variable, though consecutive, times
t1, . . . , tm, and a non-failure from the last failure, at time tm, onwards, until the
end of the time period τ :
θ =
∫ τ
0
∫ τ−t1
0
· · ·
∫ τ−∑m−1j=1 tj
0
kλ (λt1)
k−1
e−(λt1)
k
kλ (λt2)
k−1
e−(λt2)
k · · · (1.4)
· · · kλ (λtm)k−1 e−(λtm)ke−[λ(τ−
∑
j tj)]
k
dtm · · · dt2dt1.
Integral (1.4) does not allow for a simple analytical expression like (1.1). So, by
way of the curse of dimensionality, as m >> 1, we are prohibited from evaluating the
first cumulants of (1.4) and, as a consequence, constructing either a confidence bound
or a MaxEnt approximative distribution. However, there is a useful equivalence
relation which may be used to find these cumulants after all.
2. The Equivalence Relation
The equivalence relationship is derived first for the regular Poisson model (1.1).
Since, only for this regular case do we have the analytical solution of the target
integral with which we can compare the alternative route.
Let q be the sum of n+ 1 waiting times, which are generated by independent
Exponential processes:
q = t1 + · · ·+ tn+1, ti ∼ Exp (λ) . (2.1)
Then we may derive the probability density function of the stochastic q from the
product of n+ 1 Exponential distributions,
p( t1, . . . , tn+1|λ) =
n+1∏
i=1
λ exp (λti) , (2.2)
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and some appropriate Jacobian transformation like, for example,
t1 = q − t′2 − · · · − t′n+1,
t2 = t
′
2,
...
tn+1 = t
′
n+1.
(2.3)
By way of (2.2) and (2.3), while keeping track of the appropriate integration
limits of the n unwanted parameters, t′2, . . . , t
′
n+1, we may find the probability
distribution of q:
p(q|λ) = λn+1 exp (−λq)
∫ q
0
∫ q−t′2
0
· · ·
∫ q−∑n+1i=2 t′i
0
dt′m · · · dt′3dt′2
= λ
(λq)
n
n!
exp (−λq) . (2.4)
Now, as it turns out, the cumulative distribution function of q, that is, the sum
of n+ 1 Exponential waiting times,
P (q ≤ τ |λ) =
∫ τ
0
λ
(λq)
n
n!
exp (−λq) dq, (2.5)
is equivalent to the probability of observing more than n events in the time period
τ ,
P ( i > n|λ, τ) = 1−
n∑
i=0
(λτ)
i
i!
exp (−λτ) . (2.6)
So, the equivalence relationship we will make use of is, (2.5) and (2.6), see also (2.1),∫ τ
0
λ
(λq)
n
n!
exp (−λq) dq = 1−
n∑
i=0
(λτ)
i
i!
exp (−λτ) , (2.7)
or, equivalently,
1−
∫ τ
0
λ
(λq)
n
n!
exp (−λq) dq =
n∑
i=0
(λτ)
i
i!
exp (−λτ) . (2.8)
In words, if the sum of waiting times for n+ 1 waiting times is smaller than τ ,
then it follows that we have observed more than n events occurring at time τ . The
equal sign in (2.7) implies that both states of knowledge have the same truth-value,
that is, are equivalent.
Likewise, if the sum of waiting times for n+ 1 events exceeds τ , then it follows
that we yet have to observe more than n events occurring at time τ . The equal sign
in (2.8) implies that both states of knowledge have the same truth-value, that is,
are equivalent.
The product and and sum rules of Bayesian probability theory are derived by
way of consistency constraints, where consistency is operationalized as follows. If
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there are there two different routes that lead us to the self-same proposition, then
these routes should result in the same probability assignment. This then explains
the equivalencies (2.7) and (2.8), consistency demands it, [6].
The corollary of the equivalence relation (2.8) is, see (1.2),
(λτ)
n
n!
exp (−λτ) =
n∑
i=0
(λτ)
i
i!
exp (−λτ)−
n−1∑
i=0
(λτ)
i
i!
exp (−λτ)
=
∫ τ
0
λ
(λq)
n−1
(n− 1)! exp (−λq) dq −
∫ τ
0
λ
(λq)
n
n!
exp (−λq) dq
=
∫ τ
0
λ
(λq)
n−1
(n− 1)! exp (−λq)
(
1− λq
n
)
dq, (2.9)
where n ≥ 1. It may be easily checked that the corollary equivalence (2.9) does
indeed hold.
Now, we may compute the cumulants of the Poisson distribution of q either by
way of the evalution of the moments of the probability distribution (2.4) or by way
of the evalution of the moments of the stochastic (2.1).
The cumulants of a given Exponential waiting time is given as:
µ =
1
λ
,
σ =
1
λ
,
γ = 2, (2.10)
κ = 9.
So, the cumulants of n+ 1 exponential waiting times, (2.1), are given as:
µn+1 =
n+ 1
λ
,
σn+1 =
√
n+ 1
λ
,
γn+1 =
2√
n+ 1
, (2.11)
κn+1 =
9
n+ 1
+ 3,
Subtituting the cumulants (2.11) in the MaxEnt approximative distribution1,
with the integral limits
a =
−
µ
σ , if µ− 6σ < 0
µ− 6σ < 0, else.
, b = µ+ 6σ, (2.12)
1See Section 1.3.
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for the integral function (1.11), and going through the motions, we obtain for, say,
λ = 1 the following MaxEnt distribution:
Figure 1. MaxEnt distribution of sum of n+ 1 Exponential waiting times
We can compare Figure 1 with the actual distribution (2.4), for λ = 1:
Figure 2. Analytical distrubution of sum of n + 1 Exponential
waiting times
By way of the equivalency (2.9), the road is now opened to evaluate the first
cumulants of (1.4). This will allow us construct the MaxEnt approximation, as
discussed in Section 1.3, of the Beta-Like distribution of a Poisson-Like process,
where the event generating mechanism follows a Weibull instead of an Exponential
distribution.
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3. Making Use of the Equivalence Relation
Let q be the sum of n+ 1 waiting times, which are generated by independent
Weibull processes:
q = t1 + · · ·+ tn+1, ti ∼Weibull (k, λ) , (3.1)
where the Weibull distribution is given as
p( t| k, λ) = kλ (kλ)k−1 exp
[
(−tλ)k
]
. (3.2)
The cumulants of a given Weibull waiting time are given as, (3.2):
µ =
∫ ∞
0
t p( t| k, λ) dt,
σ =
√∫ ∞
0
(t− µ)2 p( t| k, λ) dt,
γ =
1
σ3
∫ ∞
0
(t− µ)3 p( t| k, λ) dt, (3.3)
κ =
1
σ4
∫ ∞
0
(t− µ)4 p( t| k, λ) dt,
which evaluates to
µ =
Γ
(
1
k
)
kλ
,
σ =
√
Γ
(
k+2
k
)− Γ(k+1k )2
λ
,
γ =
k3 Γ
(
k+3
k
)− 6 k Γ( 2k)Γ( 1k)+ 2 Γ( 1k)3
k3
[
Γ
[
k+2
k
)− Γ(k+1k )2] 32 , (3.4)
κ =
k4 Γ
(
k+4
k
)− 12 k2 Γ( 3k)Γ( 1k)+ 12 k Γ( 2k)Γ( 1k)2 − 3 Γ( 1k)4
k4
[
Γ
[
k+2
k
)− Γ(k+1k )2]2 .
So, the cumulants of n+ 1 Weibull waiting times, (3.1), are given as, (3.4):
µn+1 = (n+ 1)µ,
σn+1 =
√
n+ 1σ,
γn+1 =
γ√
n+ 1
, (3.5)
κn+1 =
κ
n+ 1
+ 3,
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Likewise, the cumulants of n Weibull waiting times, (3.1), are given as, (3.4):
µn = n µ,
σn =
√
nσ,
γn =
γ√
n
, (3.6)
κn =
κ
n
+ 3,
The cumulants (3.5) and (3.6) may be used to construct the MaxEnt approx-
imations of, respectively, the distributions of n + 1 and n Weibull waiting times.
These MaxEnt distributions may then substituted into (2.9), in order to get an
approximation of the intractable Poisson-Like probability model (1.4).
In order to construct the Beta-Like distribution of the Poisson-Like probability
model (1.4), the MaxEnt distributions that take as their inputs the cumulants in
(3.5) and (3.6), which are functions of the unknown parameters k and λ, (3.4), have
to be weighted by the Weibull posterior (3.8), and summated.
For example, if partition the 6-sigma of (k, λ)-parameter space in a n-by-n grid,
then we substitute the center coordinates of the (k, λ) squares in the cumulants
(3.5) and (3.6), construct and weigh the resulting n× n = n2 MaxEnt distributions
with probability volumes of the corresponding squares, we then summate these
weighed MaxEnt distributions, which will leave us with an approximation of the
highly intractable Beta-Like distribution of the Poisson-Like probability model (1.4).
Likewise, if we wish to find the Beta-Like distribution of the Poisson-Like
equivalence of (2.1), then by way of (2.4), (2.7), and (3.5), we may construct, with
the above described procedure, of weiging Maxent distributions, its approximative
distribution.

CHAPTER 4
Bayesian Model Selection
In Bayesian statistic there are four entitities of interest: the prior, the likelihood,
the posterior, and the evidence. Now, anyone somewhat familiar with Bayesian
statistics probably knows about the first three of these entitites, since these are
needed for Bayesian parameter estimation. However, the fourth entity, the evidence,
essential for Bayesian model selection, is less well known.
This is unfortunate. Because, even if the posterior represents the optimal
parameter estimation procedure, if the model employed is inappropriate, then the
optimality of the parameter estimation procedure will not make the underlying
model less inappropriate. And we quote Skilling:
I know of no other discipline in which half of the principal equation
is so widely ignored, and it should not be ignored here either. I
could (and often do) argue that the evidence
Z = p(D) =
∫
p(D|λ) dλ
is even more important than the posterior
p(D|λ) = p(λ,D)
p(D)
=
p(λ,D)
Z
on the frounds that algebraically it has to be evaluated first, and
logically there’s no need to proceed to the posterior if the evidence
is unacceptably weaker than that from some other candidate. So
it’s the posterior that is subordinate to the evidence and definitely
not the other way around. I myself think of “Bayesian inference”
as the generation of the evidence, with the posterior following if
needed. Evidence is primary.
Now, the reason that we have gotten as far as we have, algebraically speaking,
without introducing the concept of the evidence, is because we have made use of
the fact that the prior time the likelihood is proportional to the posterior:
pi(λ)L(λ) ∝ p(λ|D) , (0.7)
where pi(λ) is proportional to the prior p(λ) and L(λ) is proportional to p(D|λ),
the probability of the data given the parameter λ.
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Seeing that any probability distribution should integrate to one, we may properly
normalize (0.7) by way of the indentity:
p(λ|D) = pi(λ)L(λ)∫
pi(λ)L(λ) dλ
=
pi(λ)L(λ)
C
. (0.8)
Note that the normalizing constant
C =
∫
pi(λ)L(λ) dλ, (0.9)
is only equal to the evidence
Z =
∫
p(λ) p(D|λ) dλ, (0.10)
if the pi and L are both properly normalized; where the former is normalized over
the unknown parameter λ and the latter over the data D.
Note that until now, by way of the use of proportionality sign, we have used
the Bayesian short hand (0.7) to present our posteriors. In what follows, We will
compute, for demonstrative purposes, the evidences for the models in which the
generating failure mechanisms are Exponential and Weibull, respectively. But first
we will give a simple outline of the procudure of Bayesian model selection.
1. Bayesian Model Selection
Let p(λ| I) be the prior of some parameter λ, conditional on the prior background
information I. Let p(D|λ,M) be the probability of the data D, conditional on a
given parameter λ and the particular likelihood model M which was invoked. Let
p(λ|D,M, I) be the posterior distribution of λ, conditional on the data D, the
likelihood model M , and the prior background information I.
We then have, by way of the product rule, or, equivalently, Bayes’ theorem,
that, [6]:
p(λ|D,M, I) = p(λ| I) p(D|λ,M)
p(D|M, I) , (1.1)
where
p(D|M, I) =
∫
p(λ| I) p(D|λ,M) dλ, (1.2)
is the marginalized likelihood of the model M and the background information I,
also known as the evidence of M and I.
Note that the evidence judges (1.2) judges both the likelihood model, M , as
well as the prior model, I, that went into the construction of the posterior. Now,
this could be seen as a weakness of Bayesian model selection1, since in general all
the ingenuity goes into the construction of a sophisticated likelihood model. So,
1As was once suggested to the first author, during a colloquiem on Bayesian model selection.
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why bother with some uninformative prior, when we only want to compare different
likelihood models?
There are two reasons why it is a good thing that Bayesian model selection takes
into account both the prior and the likelihood, and does not neglect the former.
Firstly, there are instances, for example in image reconstruction [8], where all
the artfulness goes into the construction of the prior, and there we have that it is
the likelihood which is trivial. So, it is precisely because the Bayesian probability
theory puts the prior and likelihood models automatically on an equal footing, that
Bayesian model selection can differentiate between the different prior models of
image reconstruction inference problems, without breaking down.
Secondly, by judging the prior the evidence automatically guards us against the
danger of over-parametrization, that is, choosing such a complex likelihood model,
in terms of the number of parameters employed, that we fit the noise in the data as
structural part of the data.
Say we have m different likelihood models, M1, . . . ,Mm, to choose from and
one class of, say, uninformative prior background models, I. Then we may compute
m different evidence values p(D|Mj , I), for j = 1, . . . ,m.
Let p(Mj) be the prior probability distribution of the likelihood models Mj , and
let p(Mj |D, I) be the posterior probability distribution of these models, conditional
on the data and the general prior background information I. Then we have that
p(Mj |D, I) = p(Mj) p(D|Mj , I)∑
i p(Mi) p(D|Mi, I)
(1.3)
for j = 1, . . . ,m.
Note that if we have that p(Mj) = p(Mk), for j 6= k, then we have that (1.3)
reduces to
p(Mj |D, I) = p(D|Mj , I)∑
i p(D|Mi, I)
(1.4)
Stated differently, if we assign equal prior probabilities to our different likelihoods
models, then the posterior probabilities of these likelihood models reduce to their
normalized evidence values. This, then, is why the likelihood models may be ranked
by their respective evidence values, [7].
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2. Computing Evidence Values
For the Exponential model, which we designate M1, we have that the likelihood
model is given as, (2.4),
p(D|λ,M1) =
r∏
i=1
λ exp (−λxi) dxi
n−r∏
j=1
exp (−λyj)
= λr exp
−λ
 r∑
i=1
xi +
n−r∑
j=1
yj
 r∏
i=1
dxi. (2.1)
As a prior we take the properly normalized uninformative prior:
p(λ| I) = Cλ
λ
, (2.2)
where Cλ is the normalizing constant
C−1λ =
∫ bλ
aλ
dλ
λ
= log bλ − log aλ. (2.3)
where aλ and bλ define the prior range of possible values of λ.
Cogent prior information regarding aλ is that value of λ for which, for some
given time interval tau, the expection value λτ would become so small that too few
failures would be witnessed in said time period. Cogent prior information regarding
bλ is that value of λ for which, for some given time interval tau, the expection value
λτ would become so large that too many failures would be witnessed in said time
period.
Multiplying the properly normalized likelihood (2.1) with the the properly
normalized prior (2.2), we obtain the the properly normalized bivariate distribution
of both the parameter and the data:
p(λ,D|M1, I) = Cλλr−1 exp
−λ
 r∑
i=1
xi +
n−r∑
j=1
yj
 r∏
i=1
dxi, (2.4)
which, being properly normalized, will allow us to evaluate the evidence of M1.
By way of (1.2) and (2.4), we then evaluate the evidence for the Exponential
model as
p(D|M1, I) =
∫ bλ
aλ
p(λ,D|M1, I) dλ
= Cλ
∏
i
dxi
∫ bλ
aλ
λr−1 exp
−λ
∑
i
xi +
∑
j
yj
 dλ (2.5)
≈ Cλ (r − 1)!(∑
i xi +
∑
j yj
)r ∏
i
dxi. (2.6)
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For the Weibull model, which we designate M2, we have that the likelihood
model is given as, (3.4),
p(D| k, λ,M2) =
r∏
i=1
kλ (λxi)
k−1
exp
[
(−λxi)k
]
dxi
n−r∏
j=1
exp
[
(−λyj)k
]
= λrkkr exp
−λk
 r∑
i=1
xki +
n−r∑
j=1
ykj
 r∏
i=1
xk−1i dxi. (2.7)
As a prior we take the properly normalized uninformative prior:
p(k, λ| I) = p(k| I) p(λ| I)
=
Ck
k
Cλ
λ
(2.8)
where Cλ is as in (2.3) and Ck is the normalizing constant
C−1k =
∫ bk
ak
dk
k
= log bk − log ak. (2.9)
where ak and bk define the prior range of possible values of k.
Multiplying the properly normalized likelihood (2.7) with the the properly
normalized prior (2.8), we obtain the the properly normalized bivariate distribution
of both the parameters and the data:
p(k, λ,D|M2, I) = CλCkλrk−1kr−1 exp
−λk
 r∑
i=1
xki +
n−r∑
j=1
ykj
 r∏
i=1
xk−1i dxi,
(2.10)
which, being properly normalized, will allow us to evaluate the evidence of M2.
By way of (1.2) and (2.10), we then evaluate the evidence for the Weibull model
as
p(D|M2, I) =
∫ bk
ak
∫ bλ
aλ
p(k, λ,D|M2, I) dλ dk
= CλCk
∏
i
dxi
∫ bk
ak
∫ bλ
aλ
λrk−1kr−1 exp
−λk
∑
i
xki +
∑
j
ykj
∏
i
xk−1i dλ dk
≈ CλCk (r − 1)!
∏
i
dxi
∫ bk
ak
kr−2
∏
i x
k−1
i(∑
i x
k
i +
∑
j y
k
j
)r dk, (2.11)
where the integral over unknown shape parameter k must be evaluated numerically.
Say, we do not have any prior preference for either model M1 or M2. Then,
letting the data speak for itself, we assign equal prior probabilities to both likelihood
models. We then, by way of (1.4), (2.5), and (2.11), may compute the posterior
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probability of M1:
p(M1|D, I) = p(D|M1, I)
p(D|M1, I) + p(D|M2, I)
≈
[Cλ (r − 1)!
∏
i dxi]
1
(
∑
i xi+
∑
j yj)
r
[Cλ (r − 1)!
∏
i dxi]
1
(
∑
i xi+
∑
j yj)
r + [Cλ (r − 1)!
∏
i dxi]Ck
∫ kr−2∏i xk−1i
(
∑
i x
k
i+
∑
j y
k
j )
r dk
=
(∑
i xi +
∑
j yj
)−r
(∑
i xi +
∑
j yj
)−r
+ Ck
∫ kr−2∏i xk−1i
(
∑
i x
k
i+
∑
j y
k
j )
r dk
, (2.12)
where we have cancelled out all the terms shared by both evidence values (2.5) and
(2.11).
Furthermore, seeing that, the normalizing constant Cλ, (2.3), cancels out, we
may let (2.2) be an improper prior and let the constants of integration go to aλ → 0
and bλ →∞. This allows us to replace the ‘approximately-equal-to’ signs in (2.5)
and (2.11) with an equality signs, which propagates through in (2.12).
By way of (1.4), (2.5), and (2.11), we may also compute the posterior probability
of M2:
p(M2|D, I) = p(D|M2, I)
p(D|M1, I) + p(D|M2, I)
≈
[Cλ (r − 1)!
∏
i dxi]Ck
∫ kr−2∏i xk−1i
(
∑
i x
k
i+
∑
j y
k
j )
r dk
[Cλ (r − 1)!
∏
i dxi]
1
(
∑
i xi+
∑
j yj)
r + [Cλ (r − 1)!
∏
i dxi]Ck
∫ kr−2∏i xk−1i
(
∑
i x
k
i+
∑
j y
k
j )
r dk
=
Ck
∫ kr−2∏i xk−1i
(
∑
i x
k
i+
∑
j y
k
j )
r dk(∑
i xi +
∑
j yj
)−r
+ Ck
∫ kr−2∏i xk−1i
(
∑
i x
k
i+
∑
j y
k
j )
r dk
, (2.13)
where we have again cancelled out all the terms shared by both evidence values
(2.5) and (2.11).
3. A Word of Caution
Note that for λ we, eventually, used an improper uninformative prior. We did
so when we let constants of integration in (2.3) go to aλ → 0 and bλ → ∞; thus,
giving us a normalizing constant of
C−1λ =
∫ ∞
0
dλ
λ
=∞, (3.1)
or, equivalently,
Cλ =
1
∞ = 0. (3.2)
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The only reason we had the freedom to do so was because the constant Cλ
cancelled out in (2.12) and (2.13). Thus, removing the inverse infinities, which
resulted from the improper, that is, diverging, prior of λ. Now, had we done the
same for constants of integration in (2.9), then we would have obtained an inverse
infinity Ck = 0, which would have not cancelled out in (2.12) and (2.13); thus giving
us posterior model probabilities:
p(M1|D, I) =
(∑
i xi +
∑
j yj
)−r
(∑
i xi +
∑
j yj
)−r = 1, (3.3)
and
p(M2|D, I) = 0(∑
i xi +
∑
j yj
)−r = 0. (3.4)
We see in (3.3) and (3.4) how Bayesian model selection may punish us for
non-parsimoneous priors when the normalizing constants of these priors do not
cancel out in the posterior of the competing likelihood models. To the uninitiated
this may seem as a bother. But we Bayesians would not have it any other way.
Because it is this penalizing mechanism of Bayesian model selection, which is just
a straight forward of the product and sum rules, which automatically protects us
from the dangers of over-fitting.
For example, these authors had to choose among regression models2 having four
up to a thousand possible regression coefficients to model noisy data. By deriving a
parsimoneous prior for the regression coefficients,[3], we were able to let the data
do the talking. We found that the Bayesian probability theory picked the likelihood
model having only sixty-four parameters. Those models having more parameters,
though having a better likelihood fit, because of the greater number of parameters,
were penelized for their prior probability volume and, as consequence, noise was
minimally fitted as part of the structure.
The take-home message from all this is the following: In the computing of the
evidences, (1.2),
(1) improper priors should only be used if their normalizing constants will
cancel out in (1.3), and
(2) priors whose normalizing constants do not cancel out should be as parsi-
moneous as possible.
2Those regression models being C-splines models, [1].
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